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It now seems so long ago that the story of the collision of the U.S.S.
Greeneville and the M/V Ehime Maru dominated newspaper headlines and hourly news
flashes on radio and television. In the wake of their collision off Oahu, the
matter quickly shifted from a drama at sea to a drama in court, as investigation
led to Navy hearings for determination of the collision's causes and
culpability. At issue in those hearings were the performances of both crews,
and particularly that of the crew of the Greeneville, for whom there loomed for
a while the specter of trial by court martial for breach of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. Eventually, a formal board of inquiry made findings supporting
its recommendation of disciplinary action short of court martial, and, after the
Greeneville's captain resigned from the Service, the matter faded from public
view.
There is more to a collision at sea than "mariner error" and the concomitant
possibility of criminal or professional sanctions for mariners found to have
erred. Somewhat like corporations, ships themselves are regarded as distinct
legal persons by maritime law and courts; like corporations, ships are both
bound by duty and at risk of liability for its breach. Indeed, in the
particular circumstances of collision at sea, the legal positions of two vessels
are determined largely by reference to their relative situations in the period
leading up to their calamitous contact. Before any collision, one vessel is
said to be "burdened" with regard to another, which is said, in turn, to be
"privileged". The burdened vessel is always obliged to maneuver so as to avoid a
privileged vessel, and failure of avoidance generally leaves the burdened vessel
at least partially, if not exclusively, at fault and liable for the damages
ensuing.
Rules of the Road regulate vessel traffic in both international and inland waters.  
Those pertaining to international waters are embodied both in a multilateral
treaty to which seafaring nations are all parties and in the domestic law of the
United States. When the Ehime Maru and the Greeneville steamed that day off the
coast of Hawaii, the same collision avoidance rules applied to both the Japanese
training vessel and the American nuclear submarine. For example, each was at
all times required by Rule 5 of the Rules of the Road to "maintain a proper
look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means in the
prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the
situation and of the risk of collision." Each vessel was at all times obliged by
Rule 6 to proceed at a safe speed "so that she can take proper and effective
action to the avoid collision and be stopped in a distance appropriate to the
prevailing circumstances and conditions." Among the factors to be taken into
consideration in determining a safe speed, Rule 6 lists the state of visibility
and the maneuverability of the vessel "with special reference to stopping
distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions." Both vessels were
obliged by Rule 7 to use all available means appropriate to the prevailing
circumstances to determine if risk of collision exists, and to resolve any doubt
by assuming that a risk exists.
The Rules of the Road refer to radar, but not to sonar. A vessel with radar is
obliged by Rule 7 to make "proper use" of it for early detection of a collision
risk and for systematic observation of detected vessels. The same rule dictates
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that, “Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information,
especially scanty radar information." What Rule 7 says about vessels equipped
with radar seems informative about what might be required by law of vessels
equipped with sonar. According to Rule 2, "Nothing in these Rules shall
exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master, or crew thereof, from the . . .
neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of
seamen or by the special circumstances of the case."
That marine collisions in general do not occur with greater frequency has often
been explained by mariners with reference to the "big ocean-small boat" theory
of probability. A corollary might take into account the third dimension in
which submarines operate and the proportion of time at sea spent by a modern
submarine at depths well out of the way of other vessels. There is,
nevertheless, a small collection of reported judicial decisions involving
submarines. The first, Nantasket Beach Steamship Co. v. United States, 292 F.
389 (D. Mass. 1923), appears to have been filed promptly after passage of the
Act of Congress waiving sovereign immunity for the first time in cases in which
damage was alleged to have been caused by a naval vessel. Five years earlier,
the submarine L-10 had collided with the Mayflower, a side-wheeler ferry
carrying 1,200 passengers, while the two vessels were passing in a fogbound
Boston Harbor, and the court found the submarine liable for proceeding at an
immoderate speed on the wrong side of the channel. That the L-10 was a
submersible was of no legal moment. This was a collision case of the garden
variety, and the government did not appeal. Shortly after the collision, the L-
10 transited the Atlantic and spent the rest of the war hunting German u-boats
off the British Isles.
Submarines diving and surfacing have on occasion entangled themselves in fishing
nets, especially those deployed in dragging or trawling for fish. In Woodbury
v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mass. 1948), vacated and remanded, 175
F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1949), the Sea Owl, a veteran of three war cruises in the
Pacific during WWII (and the winner of five battle stars), was conducting
routine diving tests in a designated submarine operating area off the
Massachusetts coast at Ipswich Bay. She was accompanied by a surface vessel,
the Falcon, who flew the signal flags How and Peter from each yardarm.
According to the International Code of Signals in effect at the time, the two
flags together communicated to all mariners that "Submarines are operating in
this vicinity; you should navigate with great caution."
On a clear day, in a calm sea, and after observing her by periscope, the Sea Owl
snagged the nets of the trawler Ariel. The Ariel, which had not noticed the
periscopes or their wakes, altered course into danger after the submarine went
blind. Quick action on the part of the Ariel's crew separated the fishing boat
from her net before the momentum of the submarine could drag her under.
Afterward, the vessel's owner sued to recover the value of his lost nets. Judge
Wyzanski, then serving on the federal district court in Massachusetts, found the
submarine at fault for submerging on a course that would take the sub into
dangerous proximity to the trawler. He declined to find the trawler also at
fault for her failure to display signals indicating that she was trawling. On
appeal, the fault of the submarine was affirmed. The words of Circuit Judge
Woodbury writing for the court of appeals bear repeating:
We think it clear that the operation of a vessel below the surface
where she cannot be seen and cannot give visual or audible signals,
creating as it obviously does manifest “dangers of navigation and
collision” not only to herself but to other vessels in the vicinity,
constitutes a “special circumstance” . . . and thus invokes the so
called “special circumstances” rule embodied as to inland waters in
[what is now Rule 2, see above]. And we think that application of
this latter rule requires the submerged vessel to “keep out of the
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way” of the surface vessel regardless of their respective courses
for in the very nature of the situation the ordinary surface vessel
cannot know or be expected to know of the submarine's presence,
whereas the latter with her periscopes and sound gear can not only
know that a surface ship is in the vicinity but can also determine
that vessel's course and speed . . . .
In short it seems to us that a submarine, operating as the Sea
Owl was operating during the seven minute interval preceding her
entanglement in the Ariel's net, is analogous to a surface vessel
operating blacked-out at night as far as visibility is concerned.
That is to say, we think it is just as difficult to see the
periscopes of a submarine in the daytime as it is to see a blacked-
out surface vessel at night. Therefore we regard as in point the
Lind and Australia Star cases, supra, in which it was held, applying
the “special circumstances” rule, that a blacked-out vessel,
although on a normally holding-on course, is required to “keep out
of the way” of a lighted vessel, although on a normally giving-way
course, for the reason that it is “substantially impossible” for
those on the lighted vessel to see the unlighted one very far away,
and even if they should see her, to make out her course and speed,
and for the further reason that the navigator of the lighted ship,
knowing that his vessel could be plainly seen, would be “justified
in supposing” that the navigators of the unlighted ship would shape
the course of their vessel to avoid him, since they would know that
their vessel could not be seen or anything done to avoid a collision
with her until she was close at hand.
The court of appeals went on to reverse the judgment below excusing the trawler,
finding that, while no rule explicitly obliged a trawler to signal that she was
dragging her net, she was obliged in this instance to do so by what is now Rule
2 because she was trawling in a designated submarine operating area with actual
notice of a submarine operating in her vicinity. Both vessels were therefore to
blame for the collision.
In 1975, forty miles off Cadiz, the nuclear submarine Von Steuben was underway
and submerged, serving as a target for the exercise of Spanish submarine hunting
helicopters. The game was afoot in a military exercise area identified on
navigation charts used by mariners. The sub's active (pinging) sonar was
silent, in order to evade her hunters. By passive (listening) sonar, her crew
detected a surface vessel approaching, and the sub was maneuvered to cross that
vessel's wake, so that the submarine's noise might be shielded from the sonars
of the helicopters above. What the crew of the sub did not realize was that the
noise overhead was that of a tug, the Fairplay X, with an inoperative vessel,
the liberty ship Sealady, following silently in tow. The Von Steuben's bow
planes tangled in the submerged towline, jamming so that the sub threatened to
sink to the bottom. In response to this predicament, her commander ordered an
emergency surfacing maneuver, that is, he ordered the main ballast blown. The
sub promptly came up under the towed vessel, lifting her out of the water and so
seriously damaging her that she had to be beached in order to avert her sinking,
which resulted in a total loss of both the vessel and her cargo. Owners of both
tug and tow later sued the United States in the Southern District of New York,
and, in Brodosplas v. United States, 1975 AMC 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court
found the Von Steuben to be solely at fault for the collision. According to the
court, fault for the collision lay not in the sub's ballast blow, but in her
earlier turn across the tug's wake, which led to ensnarement, and thence to
collision. It was apparently black letter law for the court that "A submarine
submerged is a burdened vessel." No authority for that proposition is cited in
the court's opinion. The court went on to identify several steps that, as
burdened vessel, the sub might have taken that would have revealed the presence
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of the tow. The most compelling of these was to coordinate communications ahead
of time with the helicopters overhead, so that they might alert the submarine to
what she could not see. Among the court's findings was the fact that "it is not
the practice of the Navy to use picket boats while submarines are operating."
For the court, "Such a policy is not evidence of what would be proper conduct,
where maneuvers are being conducted in normally used sea lanes near a harbor."
Regarding an emergency blow, the court was persuaded that:
The evidence is clear in showing that the surfacing of a submarine
is a dangerous maneuver at any time. In an emergency blow there is
no control over speed of surfacing. In the Von Steuben's situation,
the use of the periscope or sonar would have been of no value, since
the position of the submarine at the time of the order to blow was
beyond the control of the vessel's crew.
In this case, the court was convinced that the captain had "acted properly in
ordering the emergency blow. He had lost control of his ship, his stern planes
were jammed, and the possibility of an irreversible plunge to the bottom of the
ocean was very real." No appeal was made from the decision of the district
court. The Von Steuben served another nineteen years before decommissioning in
1994.
It seems clear from the published reports that the Greeneville blew main ballast
merely to demonstrate a maneuver (or the prowess of her crew in its execution),
and not to escape from danger. By ordering that maneuver, her captain
consciously surrendered control of her steering and speed, at a time when the
sub was blind, that is, after he had downed scopes and taken her deeper.
For obvious reasons, the Navy refrains from advising the public in advance of
the time, place, or nature of submarine operations, and our submarines operate
routinely beneath the surface of international waters open to any vessel. It
also seems that, at some time after 1946, when the Falcon accompanied the Sea
Owl, but failed to warn off the Ariel, the Silent Service abandoned the practice
of assigning surface escorts for submarines conducting surfacing and diving
exercises. The Spanish helicopters chasing the Von Steuben might have saved the
Sealady, had the intrusion of the tug and tow prompted them to switch roles from
adversaries to airborne escorts for the American sub. They might then have
warned off the tug and tow, or else alerted the sub below. Instead, because the
role of safety escort had not been suggested in the planning or preparation for
their joint exercise, they did nothing.
There is a whiff of hubris in assuming a modern submarine will always avoid
other vessels while at the shallow depths they occupy in common. Detailing a
surface or airborne escort for training evolutions at those depths seems no more
than common sense, and would not materially jeopardize the secrets of submarine
whereabouts or their capabilities. Perhaps that Old Navy way of doing things is
getting another look where contemporary submariners gather to discuss the safety
of their training and operations.
